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ABSTRACT
Charter schools are publicly funded but operate outside the regulatory framework and collective bargaining
agreements characteristic of traditional public schools. In return for this freedom, charter schools are
subject to heightened accountability. This paper estimates the impact of charter school attendance
on student achievement using data from Boston, where charter schools enroll a growing share of students.
We also evaluate an alternative to the charter model, Boston's pilot schools. These schools have some
of the independence of charter schools, but operate within the school district, face little risk of closure,
and are covered by many of same collective bargaining provisions as traditional public schools. Estimates
using student assignment lotteries show large and significant test score gains for charter lottery winners
in middle and high school. In contrast, lottery-based estimates for pilot schools are small and mostly
insignificant. The large positive lottery-based estimates for charter schools are similar to estimates
constructed using statistical controls in the same sample, but larger than those using statistical controls
in a wider sample of schools. The latter are still substantial, however.  The estimates for pilot schools
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Charter schools operate with considerably more independence than traditional public schools. They
are free to structure their curriculum and school environment; for instance, many charter schools
t more instructional hours into a year by running longer school days and providing instruction on
weekends and during the summer (Matthews 2009, Wilson 2008, Hoxby et al, 2009). Because few
charter schools are unionized, they can hire and re teachers and administrative sta without regard
to the collectively bargained seniority and tenure provisions that constrain such decisions in most
public schools. Although charter students made up only 2.9 percent of U.S. public school enrollment
in 2008-2009, charter enrollment has grown rapidly and seems likely to accelerate in the near future
(NAPCS 2009). The growth of charter schools is an important component of the contemporary
education reform movement's pursuit of accountability and exibility in public education.
Proponents see charter schools' freedom from regulation as a source of educational innovation, with
the added benet of providing a source of competition that may prompt innovation and improvement
in the rest of the public system. At the same time, charter schools are controversial because, after a
transition period in which the state provides subsidies, they receive a tuition payment for each enrolled
student paid by students' home (or \sending") districts. In Massachusetts, the site of our study,
tuition payments are determined largely by the average per-pupil expenditure in sending districts.
Not surprisingly, therefore, public school districts are concerned about the revenue lost when their
students enroll in charter schools.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the causal eects of charter school attendance and a closely
related alternative, called pilot schools, on student achievement. Pilot schools arose in Boston as a
union-supported alternative to charter schools.1 Boston's charter schools are legally constituted by the
state as individual school districts and therefore operate independently of the Boston Public Schools
(BPS). In contrast, Boston's pilot schools are legally part of the BPS district, and the extent to which
they operate outside collective bargaining provisions is spelled out in school-specic election-to-work
agreements signed by pilot faculty. In addition to these negotiated exemptions, pilot schools have
generally greater exibility and decision-making powers over school budgets, academic programs, and
educational policies than do traditional BPS schools. This includes freedom with regard to policies
related to student promotion, graduation, discipline, and attendance.2
1See Center for Collaborative Education (2006).
2See the Boston Teachers Union website (http://www.btu.org/leftnavbar/HP PilotSchools.htm), which also notes:
\Pilot schools do not have to purchase a variety of services provided by the central oce, such as substitute teachers,
textbook, SPED contracted services, and academic coaches. By not purchasing these services pilot schools `save' ,
typically, $300 to $400 per year per student. They are allowed to retain these funds and purchase these services privately
if they wish."In practice, pilot schools occupy a middle ground between charter schools and traditional public
schools. Their teachers are part of the Boston Teachers Union (BTU), with their pay, benets and
working hours determined by the district-wide BTU contract. On the other hand, pilot schools can set
their own policies with regard to curriculum, student promotion, and graduation. They also t more
instructional hours into a school year than traditional schools, but not as many as the charter schools.
Accountability standards appear to bind less strictly for pilot schools than for charter schools: while
nine Massachusetts charters have been lost, no pilot school has been closed.
The charter and pilot school models t into a broader movement towards choice and decentral-
ization in public education. Related policy experiments that have also been the subject of impact
evaluations include vouchers (Rouse 1998; Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King and Kremer 2002), mag-
net schools (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2006), and intra-district choice plans (Abdulkadiro glu and
S onmez 2003; Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2008; Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak and Roth 2009). Charter
schools appear to be one of the most widely replicated members of this reform family.
The schools in our study are attended by students who would otherwise attend traditional Boston
public schools. The Boston Public Schools (BPS) system serves a disproportionately Black and His-
panic student population. Like students in many urban schools, BPS students have lower test scores
and lower rates of high school graduation and college attendance than students from nearby suburban
districts. Boston's charter schools also serve a high proportion of Black students, even relative to the
majority non-white BPS district. The eects of charter schools in urban populations are of special
interest since any gains in this context might help reduce the black-white achievement gap.
The major empirical challenge in any study of alternative school models is selection bias. Students
who attend charter and pilot schools dier in a number of ways from the general pool of public
school students, a fact that biases naive comparisons. We can hope to eliminate some of this bias
by controlling for student characteristics such as free lunch status, but the possibility of bias from
unobserved variables such as motivation or family background remains. An important aspect of
our study, therefore, is the use of student admissions lotteries to estimate causal eects. These
lotteries, which admit applicants randomly at over-subscribed schools, are used to construct a quasi-
experimental research design that should generate unbiased estimates of the causal eects of charter
and pilot attendance.
A charter or pilot school contributes application cohorts to our lottery estimates when the school
is over-subscribed and therefore runs a lottery, has complete lottery records, and, in the case of pilots,
uses a lottery to select students.3 In addition, the charter schools in our lottery sample were all
operating at the time we were collecting lottery data (closed charter schools have often been under-
3More precisely, a given school-year-grade cell contributes to the lottery analysis if entry at that point is over-
subscribed and the resultant lottery records are available.
2subscribed). These selection criteria may have consequences for the external validity of our results.
The over-subscription condition tilts our sample towards charter and pilot schools that parents nd
appealing, as does the requirement that schools still be open. From a policy perspective, however,
this is an interesting set of schools. As it stands, Massachusetts currently limits both the number of
charter schools and the proportion of a district's budget that can be lost due to charter enrollment.
Were the supply of alternative school models allowed to freely vary, it seems reasonable to expect
currently operating over-subscribed schools to expand and imitators to open similar schools.
The requirement that participating schools have complete lottery records also aects our selection
of charter schools for the lottery sample. Specically, the records requirement tilts the charter lottery
sample towards schools that have archived lottery records. Massachusetts law does not require charter
schools to retain their lottery data. The net impact of the record-keeping constraint is unclear. On
one hand, poor record-keeping may be a sign of disorganization that spills over into teaching. On
the other hand, lottery record-keeping may be a distraction that takes time and energy away from
instructional activity. In some cases, lost records are also a result of bad luck and the fact that the
preservation of lottery data is not a priority once the school admissions process is complete.
Finally, on the pilot side, not all schools use the centralized lottery system that is embedded in
the BPS school assignment mechanism. Some pilot schools opt out of the BPS assignment mechanism
and chose students by a combination of admissions testing or audition. Non-lottery pilots share this
feature with Boston's elite exam schools (the most famous of which is the Boston Latin School). In
contrast, over-subscribed charters must use lotteries to select students.
In an eort to gauge the generality of our lottery-based ndings, we complement the quasi-
experimental lottery analysis with an observational analysis of the full set of charter and pilot schools.
The observational analysis controls for demographic and background characteristics as well as stu-
dents' lagged test scores (for example, the elementary school scores of middle school students). This
investigation produces estimates remarkably similar to the lottery-based estimates when carried out in
the sample of charter schools that have lotteries, lending some credence to the observational analysis.
At the same time, the observational analysis suggests that the charter schools in our sample are better
than others in the sense of generating larger treatment eects. We therefore think of our (mostly
positive) charter estimates as indicative of what a certain charter model can accomplish, rather than
an overall charter-school treatment eect.
For pilot middle schools, the observational analysis also generates results that are broadly consistent
with the lottery-based analysis, but the observational results for pilot high schools are more positive
than the corresponding lottery-based estimates. This leaves a somewhat muddled picture. Across all
designs and samples, however, the estimate eects of attending a pilot school are smaller than the
3corresponding charter estimates. In the subsample of pilot middle schools that serve only grades 6-8,
lottery-based estimates of eects on middle school math scores are negative and signicantly dierent
from zero.
The next section describes Boston's charter and pilot schools in more detail and briey discusses
a few related studies and questions. Following that, Section III lays out our lottery-based estimation
framework while Section IV discusses data and descriptive statistics. Section V presents the main
lottery analysis. Section VI discusses the characteristics of the charter and pilot lottery compliers and
reports results from models with ability interactions and possible peer eects. Section VII reports
observational results from a broader sample, and compares these to the lottery estimates. The paper
concludes in Section VIII.
II Background
The 1993 Massachusetts Education Reform Act opened the door to charter schools in Massachusetts.
Non-prot organizations, universities, teachers and parents can apply to the state's Board of Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education for a charter (there are no for-prot charter schools in Massachusetts).
Massachusetts charter schools are generally managed by a board of trustees and are independent of
local school committees. Like other public schools, charter schools charge no tuition and are funded
mostly by sending districts according to formulas set by the state.
Massachusetts charter schools have a number of organizational features in common with charter
schools in other states. First, they are typically outside local collective bargaining agreements. As
a result, they have greater exibility than traditional public schools when it comes to stang, com-
pensation, and scheduling. For example, the ve Massachusetts charter schools studied by Merseth
(2009), four of which appear in our lottery sample, have a longer school day and year than public
schools. Many charter schools oer extensive tutoring during and after school. Moreover, teachers
in charter schools need not hold an active state license to begin teaching, though they must pass the
Massachusetts Test for Educator Licensure within the rst year of employment.
Wilson (2008) describes seven Boston charters, six of which are in our lottery sample, as well as a
charter school in Lynn, near Boston. Wilson identies school practices prevalent at the schools in his
sample. This collection of practices is sometimes said to characterize the \No Excuses" model, a term
that probably originates with Thernstrom and Thernstom (2003). No Excuses schools are character-
ized by small size, frequent testing, a long school day and year, selective teacher hiring, and a strong
student work ethic. Other features include an emphasis on discipline and comportment, teacher-led
whole-class instruction, and the absence of computer-aided instruction. Merseth's (2009) detailed ac-
4count of the workings of ve Boston-area charters, which she calls \high-performing schools," suggests
they share these features.
The rst two columns of Table 1 compare some of the statistically measurable dierences between
Boston charter schools and traditional (BPS) public schools. This table shows student-weighted
averages of teacher characteristics and student-teacher ratios by school type. The student-teacher
ratio is substantially lower in charter schools, and charter teachers are less likely to be licensed or to
be \highly qualied" as dened by NCLB. The latter is likely a consequence of the relative inexperience
of many charter school teachers, a fact documented in the age distribution data show in the table.4
As shown in column 7 of Table 1, the features that distinguish the full roster of Boston charter schools
are shared by the schools in our lottery sample.
Massachusetts charter schools appear to face more stringent accountability requirements than
non-charter public schools. The state Charter School Oce reviews and makes recommendations on
charter applications, reviews the performance of existing charter schools, and decides whether charters
should be renewed. Charter schools are held accountable via annual reports, nancial audits, and site
visits, and are required to le for renewal every ve years. Renewal applications must show that a
school's academic program is successful, that the school is a viable organization, and that it has been
faithful to its charter. Since 1994, the state has received a total of 350 charter applications and has
granted 76. Eight of the 76 Massachusetts charters ever granted were surrendered or revoked as of Fall
2009 (Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, 2009b). A ninth (Uphams
Corner Charter School) was revoked later in 2009.5
In the 2009-2010 school year, 26,384 Massachusetts students attended 62 operating charter schools,
including 16 in Boston (Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 2009a).
State law caps the number of charter schools at 72, and total enrollment at 30,034, so the statewide
charter cap is not a constraint. However, a provision limiting local charter spending to nine percent of
the district total generates binding or near-binding caps in specic districts, including Boston, where
charter enrollment is already relatively high. The question of whether this local cap should be lifted
is currently the subject of intense debate, fueled in part by the availability of federal stimulus money
for states that facilitate new charters (Vaznis 2009).
Pilot schools were developed jointly by BPS and the Boston Teachers Union (BTU) as an alter-
native to both charter schools and traditional public schools. Pilot schools are created as the result
4The denition of highly qualied has varied over time, but typically this designation is awarded to teachers who have
a bachelor's degree, full state certication or licensure, and have shown that they know the subject they teach (usually
this requires some additional certication). Note that in Table 1, the denominators for the proportion licensed and the
proportion highly qualied dier.
5Four of the eight charter losses through Fall 2009 occurred before school operations began. Two of the remaining
four were revocations and two were non-renewals.
5of a planning process currently funded by the Boston Foundation, a private charity, with technical
assistance from the Center for Collaborative Education, a local nonprot organization that runs the
Boston Pilot Schools Network. New schools may be granted pilot status but most are conversions from
traditional BPS schools. Pilot school conversions must be authorized by a two-thirds vote of the BTU
membership employed at the school and authorized by the BTU Pilot School Steering Committee.6
Like charter schools, pilot schools are answerable to independent governing boards. Also like
charters, pilot schools determine their own budgets, stang, curricula, and scheduling. Unlike charter
schools, however, they remain part of the Boston school district and their teachers are BTU members
covered by most contract provisions related to pay and seniority. Pilot school teachers have no job
protection within schools but remain in the BPS system if they choose to move or are removed by the
pilot school principal.
Pilot teachers sign an election-to-work agreement which spells out the extent to which union
contract provisions apply. These agreements vary by school.7 Pilot schools are subject to external
review, but the review process to date appears to be less extensive and structured than the external
state charter reviews. No pilot school has been closed or converted back to a traditional public school.8
Pilot schools are open to all students in the BPS district and operate as part of the district. In the
2007-8 school year, 6,337 BPS students were enrolled in 20 pilot schools. Assignment to all elementary
and middle pilot schools, and to two of the seven regular pilot high schools, is through the centralized
BPS choice plan, which includes a lottery when schools are over-subscribed.
Pilot teachers have characteristics between those of traditional BPS schools and charter schools,
as can be seen in columns 3 and 8 of Table 1. For example, pilot teachers are younger than traditional
BPS teachers but not as young as charter teachers. Many pilot schools share with charter schools
longer school days and years. But the BTU agreement covering pilot schools limits uncompensated
overtime, as do school-specic election-to-work agreements. This is reected in statistics on hours of
instruction that we collected from the schools in our lottery sample. The ocial BPS school year is
180 days, with a little over six hours of instruction per day, for a total of 1,110 annual school hours.
Annual school hours at pilot middle and high school hours run a little longer, but still under 1,200
hours/year. In contrast, the average charter middle school in our sample provides 1,500 hours of
6The pilot school model originated in Boston but other Massachusetts districts have begun to experiment with it. The
Massachusetts Board of Elementary and Secondary Education recently adopted a Commonwealth Pilot School option for
schools that otherwise would have been designated as underperforming under NCLB. Five Commonwealth Pilot Schools
are now operating in Boston, Fitchburg, and Springeld. Versions of the pilot school model are also being tried in Los
Angeles (Manzo, 2007).
7See http://www.ccebos.org/pilotschools/resources/index.html for sample agreements.
8For more on pilot structure, see http://www.ccebos.org/pilotschools/pilot qa.doc and
http://www.ccebos.org/pilotguides/. The current BTU contract allows for the creation of up to seven additional
pilot schools. In 2007, two pilot conversions were voted down.
6instruction, while charter high schools provide about 1,400 hours.9
Related Studies and Questions
A few recent studies use admissions lotteries to measure charter school achievement eects. These
include Hoxby and Murarka (2009), which estimates charter eects in New York City (grades 3-8),
Hoxby and Rocko (2005), which estimates the eects of three Chicago charter schools, and Dobbie
and Fryer (2009), which evaluates the eects of a charter middle and a charter elementary school
located in the Harlem Children's Zone. All three studies report positive eects, though they vary by
grade and subject. The achievement gains reported in Hoxby and Murarka (2009) and Hoxby and
Rocko (2005) are fairly modest, though Hoxby and Rocko note problems with the Chicago charter
lotteries that may invalidate some of their ndings. The Dobbie and Fryer (2009) estimates for middle
school math scores are the largest of the three, with impacts reaching almost half of a standard
deviation per year in charter. Dobbie and Fryer also report IV estimates for an elementary school
in the Harlem Children's Zone based on proximity to the Zone; these are imprecise. Farther aeld,
Clark (2009) uses a regression-discontinuity design to study the impact of attendance at Britain's
grant-maintained schools, a charter-like model. Grant-maintained schools appear to have produced
large achievement gains.10
A related study by Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) uses admissions lotteries to estimate the eect
of attending Chicago magnet schools. Like Boston pilot schools, Chicago magnet schools are part
of the local (Chicago Public Schools) district. Chicago magnet schools are also like pilot schools in
that they oer special programs and enjoy a degree of autonomy while operating within the Chicago
Public School district. Cullen, Jacob and Levitt nd no evidence that winning a magnet lottery
raises test scores or any other measure of academic performance, though magnet students are less
likely to self-report being arrested or involved in disciplinary actions. Using administrative crime
records, Deming (2009) similarly nds that adolescents lotteried into their rst-choice public school
in Charlotte-Mecklenburg are arrested less frequently and spend fewer days incarcerated, though they
score no higher on standardized tests.
The question of whether innovations in school organization generate achievement gains is also part
of a debate over whether schools alone can address large racial achievement gaps. Positions on this
point sometimes translate into views about the social signicance of charter schools in the Knowledge
9Data on hours of instruction at charter and pilot schools come from the individual schools' web sites.
10Charter evaluations that don't use lotteries have generally produced more mixed results. See, for example, Booker,
Sass, Gill, and Zimmer (2008) for Chicago and Florida; Eberts and Hollenbeck (2002) for Michigan; Bifulco and Ladd
(2006) for North Carolina; Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, and Jansen (2007) for Texas; Berends, Mendiburo, Nicotera
(2008) for a Northwest Urban District; and CREDO (2009).
7is Power Program (KIPP). The students at KIPP schools are mostly from poor families and 95 percent
are Black and Hispanic. Although there are no KIPP schools in our sample, most of the schools for
which we have lottery data embrace the No Excuses model and serve a similar low-income, minority
population.
The sense in which KIPP constitutes a marker for the role schools can play is clear from inuential
accounts on either side. In a study of the racial achievement gap, titled No Excuses, (Thernstrom and
Thernstrom (2003, p. 43)) credit KIPP and similar No Excuses programs with impressive gains for
low-income students:
Scattered across the American landscape are what some call \break-the-mold" schools
high-poverty public schools with students who score well on statewide tests. There aren't
many of them, and all are atypical within their own districts. Nevertheless, their record of
success suggests that truly radical education innovation can change the lives of inner-city
students, whatever their race or ethnicity.
An alternative view sees schools as only one part{arguably not the most important{in a broad
struggle that requires social reform at many levels. Here is Rothstein (2004, p. 83), former New York
Times education correspondent and an articulate spokesman for the systemic view:
. . . there is nothing illogical about a belief that schools, if well-operated, can raise
lower-class achievement without investing in health, social, early childhood, after-school,
and summer programs. But while the belief is not illogical, it is implausible, and the
many claims made about instructional heroes or methods that close that gap are, upon
examination, unfounded.
Although our limited study cannot be denitive, we see the results as relevant for the evaluation
of these opposing points of view.11
III Empirical Framework
We're interested in the eects of charter or pilot school attendance on student achievement. Because
the eects of attendance at dierent types of school seem likely to be an increasing function of the
11Researchers have also studied the eects of charter schools on traditional public schools. Examples include Bettinger
(2005) and Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, and Jansen (2007). A related literature looks at the way parents make schooling
choices (see, e.g., Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2008; Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin, and Branch 2007; Jacob and Lefgren 2007).
A few studies investigate general equilibrium eects of school choice on achievement (Hoxby 2000, 2007; Rothstein 2006,
2007).
8time spent in school, we model score eects as a function of years in pilot or years in charter. The
causal relation of interest is captured using equations like this one for the scores, yigt, of student i
testing in year t in grade g:
yigt = t + g +
X
j
jdij + 0Xi + Sigt + igt: (1)
The variable Sigt is the years spent in a charter or pilot school as of the test date, counting any repeated
grades, and counting time in all charter and pilot schools, not just the ones in our lottery samples.
We also dene a year to be a charter or pilot year if any portion of that year is spent in a charter
or pilot school. The causal eect of Sigt is . The terms t and g are year-of-test and grade-of-test
eects, while Xi is a vector of demographic controls with coecient , and igt is an error term that
reects random uctuation in test scores. The dummies dij are indicators for lottery-specic risk sets
(indexed by j), described below.
If Sigt were randomly assigned, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of (1) would capture an
average causal eect of years spent at a charter or pilot school. Because students and parents selec-
tively chose schools, however, OLS estimates may be biased by correlation between school choice and
unobserved variables related to ability, motivation, or family background. We therefore use an instru-
mental variables (IV) strategy that exploits the partial random assignment of Sigt in school-specic
lotteries. Assuming the applicant lotteries are fair, students who win and lose a given lottery should
have similar characteristics.
The rst stage equations for IV estimation take the form:
Sigt = t + g +
X
j
jdij +  0Xi + Zi + igt; (2)
where t and g are year-of-test and grade eects in the rst stage. The rst-stage eect is the
coecient, , on the instrumental variable, Zi. The charter instrument is a dummy for having been
oered a seat at one of the schools in the applicants' charter risk set. The pilot instrument is a dummy
for having a BPS lottery number below the highest number oered a spot in the pilot risk set.
For a given charter applicant, the charter risk set is the list of all lotteries to which the student
applied in a given year and entry grade, among the lotteries included in our charter lottery sample.
Students who did not apply to any of the charter schools in the lottery sample are not in any charter
risk set and are therefore omitted from the IV analysis. The relevant sample of pilot applicants includes
only those students who listed a pilot school rst on their BPS assignment form (few students who
did not do so end up in a pilot school). The pilot risk set is dened by the identity of this rst-choice
9school and the applicant's walk-zone status. Charter and pilot risk sets also vary by grade of entry
and year of application (the entry cohort).12
IV Data and Descriptive Statistics
The Massachusetts Students Information Management System (SIMS) contains information on all
Massachusetts public school students' race, ethnicity, sex, reduced-price lunch status, special education
status, English-language learner status, town of residence and current school. These data are collected
in October and again at the end of the school year. We worked with SIMS les for the 2001-2002
through 2006-2007 school years. The SIMS data were used to determine how many years students
spent in a charter, pilot or traditional BPS school. A student observed at any time during a school
year in a charter or pilot school was classied as a charter or pilot student for that year. To construct
an analysis le, we used student identiers to merge SIMS demographic and school history data with
test scores from the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) database, again for
the 2001-2002 through 2007-2008 school years. The MCAS database contains raw scores for math,
English language arts (ELA), and writing. MCAS is administered each spring, typically in grades 3-8
and 10. For the purposes of our analysis, scores were standardized by subject, grade, and year to have
mean zero and unit variance in the population of students attending Boston schools.
Lottery Procedures and Sample Coverage
Each charter school collects applications and holds its own lottery in years the school is over-subscribed.
Siblings of students already attending the school are guaranteed a seat, as are students continuing
on from earlier grades. Students can apply to as many charter schools as they like; the lotteries are
statistically and administratively independent. Students may therefore be accepted or wait-listed at
more than one school. When admitted students decline, slots open up for additional oers farther
down the lottery list. Thus, some students may be oered spots immediately, while others may be
oered seats closer to the beginning of the school year. Charter school lottery records were matched
to MCAS and SIMS data using applicants' names and year and grade of application.13
12The relevant risk set for students in the pilot lottery is based on the BPS assignment mechanism. Among rst-choice
applicants to a given pilot school, admission priority is randomly assigned, with lotteries run separately for students who
live inside and outside the school's walk-zone. In the pilot analysis, the risk set is therefore specied as the interaction
of the four variables indicating the student's rst-choice pilot school, walk-zone status for that school, and the year and
grade of application.
13Gender, race, town of residence, and date of birth were used to resolve ambiguities. We matched 96.5 percent of
charter applicants at the middle school level (97.3 percent of those admitted and 94.8 percent of those not admitted) and
92.2 percent of applicants at the high school level (92 percent of those admitted and 92.9 percent of those not admitted).
10We asked all operating charter schools in Boston for current and past lottery records. The set
of charter schools and applicant years included in the lottery sample is detailed in Table A1. Of the
four charter schools with elementary grades, one had lottery records for a period that we could use,
but these are for 6th grade entrants and hence contribute to the middle school sample (this school
added elementary grades only in 2006). Of the 11 charter schools that enroll middle school students,
ve contribute to the lottery analysis. Two of the omitted middle schools closed before or while our
study was under way (one was under-subscribed), so that charter middle school coverage consists of
5 out of 9 currently operating schools. Two omitted middle schools admit primarily from their own
elementary grades. In such cases, we were unable to recover lottery records because the entry date
precedes the outcome dates by at least seven years.
Of the eight charter schools that enroll regular (non-alternative) high school students, four con-
tribute to the lottery analysis. Two of the omitted high schools closed before or during our study
(one was under-subscribed) and two admit students at younger grades and are included in the mid-
dle school sample. Our charter high school sample therefore includes all four of Boston's currently
operating regular 9-12 charter high schools.
Students apply to pilot schools as part of the regular BPS assignment mechanism. BPS parents
submit a rank order list of at least three schools in January to obtain a seat at a new school in
September. At each school, admission priority is determined in part by whether the applicant is a
continuing student who is guaranteed admission, currently has a sibling at the school, or lives in the
school's walk zone. Within these priority groups, students are selected using an ordering determined
by the BPS lottery number. The choice mechanism tries to assign as many students as possible to their
top choice, using coarse priority rankings and lottery numbers when there are more applicants than
capacity.14 This produces a system that induces random assignment (albeit with varying probabilities),
conditional on priority groups such as sibling and walk-zone status.
Students were classied as pilot applicants if they listed a pilot school as their rst choice. Because
most pilot schools are oversubscribed, students who rank a pilot school as a second or lower choice are
unlikely to be assigned to a pilot. The BPS assignment mechanism runs in multiple rounds but we
use information only from the rst round. Data on parents' choices and BPS lottery numbers came
from the BPS applications data base. These data were matched to our merged MCAS-SIMS analysis
le using state identiers.
All elementary and middle school pilots use the BPS assignment mechanism and lottery, but only
two pilot high schools do. Four others use school-specic admissions criteria, such as musical auditions,
to select their students. One is a 6-12 school that was not over-subscribed. Of the seven pilot schools
Additional information related to the construction of analysis les appears in the data appendix.
14For details, see Abdulkadiro glu and S onmez (2003) and Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak, Roth and S onmez (2006).
11that enroll elementary school students, ve were over-subscribed and contribute to the lottery sample.
Of seven pilot middle schools admitting 6th graders, six were over-subscribed and contribute to the
lottery sample. Of the four K-8 pilot schools, our lottery middle school sample includes kindergarten
applicants from three (the kindergarten entry grade is known as K2, the year after preschool, K1).
One K-8 pilot school opened too late to contribute middle school test scores by K2 applicants.
One of the high schools in our charter lottery sample (Health Careers Academy or HCA) is what
is known as a Horace Mann charter school. HCA is the only Horace Mann charter that serves the
regular 9-12 population in Boston.15 HCA is unusual in that it began as a pilot school in 1995, but
converted to a Horace Mann charter school in 1997.
Like pilot schools, a Horace Mann charter school's employees are members of the BTU bargaining
unit and Horace Mann charters are established with the approval of BPS and the BTU. Otherwise,
however, they operate like other charter schools (called Commonwealth charters). In particular, HCA
is subject to state (as opposed to district) supervision, and must submit to the same type of ve-year
review for charter renewal. HCA operates in rented space on the Northeastern University campus,
does not use BPS facilities, and is funded like other charter schools.16 The elect-to-work agreements
at HCA also appear to allow for more unpaid overtime than those at pilot schools. Because HCA has
features in common with pilot schools, however, we look briey at the implications of a reclassication
of HCA as a pilot school in our sensitivity analysis.
Student Characteristics and Covariate Balance
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for students at Boston's traditional schools, charter schools, and
pilot schools, as well as a separate breakout for those included in the charter and pilot lottery samples.
The racial and ethnic composition of the student bodies attending pilot elementary and middle schools
is similar to that at traditional BPS schools: around 45 percent Black and 30 percent Hispanic. In
15The other Boston-area Horace Mann charter school, called Boston Day and Evening Academy, is an alternative
school; it serves students aged 16-22 who are overage for grade level or have dropped out.
16The Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education describes the two charter models as follows:
A charter school is a public school that is governed by a board of trustees and operates independently of any school
committee under a ve year charter granted by the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (Board). It has
the freedom to organize around a core mission, curriculum, theme, and/or teaching method and to control its own
budget and hire (and re) teachers and sta. In return for this freedom, a charter school must attract students and
produce positive results within ve years or its charter will not be renewed. There are two types of charter schools,
Commonwealth charter schools and Horace Mann charter schools. They operate under the same set of rules as described
above, with the following exceptions. First, a Horace Mann charter school must have its charter approved by the local
school committee and the local teacher's union in addition to the Board. Second, to the extent provided by their charters,
Horace Mann charter schools may be exempt from certain provisions in local collective bargaining agreements. Third,
employees of a Horace Mann charter school remain members of the local collective bargaining unit; continue to accrue
seniority; and receive, at a minimum, the salary and benets established by the local collective bargaining agreement.
See also http://www.doemass.org/charter/qanda.doc.
12contrast, charter schools have a higher proportion of Black students (about 70 percent) and a lower
proportion of Hispanic students (about 20 percent). Dierences in racial make-up across school types
are similar at the high school level.
Roughly 85 percent of students at traditional Boston schools are eligible for free or reduced-price
lunch, a measure of poverty status. Charter students are not as poor; about 70 percent fall into this
category. The pilot school student body occupies a middle ground, with more poor students than the
charter schools but fewer than the traditional schools. Relatively few English learners (also known as
limited English prociency or LEP students) attend charter schools. For example, only seven percent
of charter middle schools students are LEP, while the traditional Boston population is 22 percent LEP
(pilot schools are close at 21 percent). Charter schools also enroll fewer special education students
than traditional schools and pilot schools. Girls are over-represented at charter schools and, to a lesser
extent, at pilot schools; this is particularly striking at the high school level, where nearly 60 percent
of charter school students are female, compared to 52 percent at the pilot schools and 50 percent at
traditional schools. Importantly, however, the demographic make-up of the charter and pilot lottery
samples, described in columns 6 and 7 of Table 2, is similar to that of the total charter and pilot
samples.
Table 2 also reports pre-treatment test scores - measured in elementary school for the middle school
sample and in middle school for the high school sample. We think of these lagged score variables as
baseline ability measures. For middle school students, baseline scores come from tests taken in fourth
grade while for high school students baseline scores come from tests taken in eighth grade. There
are no baseline scores for elementary school students, since MCAS testing starts in third grade. At
the middle school level, pilot school students have somewhat lower baseline scores than students at
traditional schools, while baseline scores of the charter students are closer to those for students in
traditional BPS schools. At the high school level, charter school students have higher baseline scores,
averaging about 0.4 standard deviations above those of students in traditional schools and a tenth of
a standard deviation above those of students attending pilot schools. Among charter school students
applying to lotteried middle schools, there is a baseline advantage of about 0.2 standard deviations.
As a measure of lottery quality, Table 3 reports covariate dierences between winners and losers.
The numbers reported in the table are regression-adjusted dierences by win/loss status, where a
win means students were oered a spot in a charter or pilot school in the relevant risk set. The only
covariates in the regression are dummies for risk sets (year of application and the set of schools applied
to for charters; rst-choice school, year of application, and walk zone status for pilots). Conditional
on these covariates, lottery wins should be randomly assigned.
With a few exceptions, the dierences in Table 3 are small and statistically insignicant. Among
13middle school applicants, charter lottery winners have baseline math scores a tenth of a standard
deviation above losers' scores; at the high school level, winners are two percentage points more likely
to be Asian and two percentage points more likely to be English learners. These dierences are
only marginally signicant and could be due to chance. Among elementary pilot schools applicants,
lottery winners are eight percentage points less likely to be eligible for a subsidized lunch, while at
the high school level, they are six percentage points more likely to be eligible. Again, these and
the other scattered marginally signicant contrasts in the table seem likely to be chance ndings.
This conclusion is reinforced by the F statistics at the bottom of each column, which test the joint
hypothesis that all dierences in baseline test scores and background characteristics in the column are
zero. Only two of these are close to a 0.05 p-value.
V Lottery-Based Estimates
Charter School Eects
Charter middle school applicants who were oered a spot at one of the schools to which they applied
spent about a year longer attending a charter school than applicants who were not oered a spot.
This dierence, which is shown in column 1 of Table 4 (labeled \rst stage"), is measured as of the
MCAS test date. The rst stage is smaller than the three-year span of middle school because about
a fth of lottery winners never attend a charter school, while some lottery losers end up in charter
school later, either because they enter the admissions lottery in a future year, gain sibling preference
when a sibling wins the lottery, or move o a wait list after the oers coded by our instrument. In
addition, some tests were taken as earlier as one year into middle school (the MCAS tests math and
ELA prociency in every middle school grade).
Middle-school students who win the charter lottery score almost 0:2 higher on ELA and 0:4
higher in math, as shown in column 2 of Table 4 (labeled \reduced form"). The 2SLS estimate of
the eect of an additional year in a charter school is the ratio of the reduced-form estimates to the
rst-stage coecients. Since the rst stage coecients are close to one, the 2SLS estimates (reported
in column 3) are similar to the reduced form estimates, though their interpretation diers. When
estimated without demographic controls, the 2SLS estimates imply that ELA scores increase by about
0:2 for each year in a charter, while the per-year math eect is 0:4. These estimates are reasonably
precise, with standard errors around 0:06   0:08, showing that our research design has the power to
detect more modest eects as well. The addition of demographic controls changes this result little, as
can be seen in column 4.
Although the reduced form eects on high school ELA and math scores are smaller than the
14corresponding reduced form eects in middle school, the high school rst stage is also smaller. As
a consequence, the ELA and math score gains generated by time spent in charter high schools are
estimated to be similar to the corresponding 2SLS estimates for middle school. High school students
also take a writing test; here the 2SLS estimates show gains of 0:17   0:28. As with the results for
middle school, the addition of demographic controls leaves the estimates largely unchanged.
Pilot School Eects
Our lottery-based analysis of pilot eects looks at elementary-grade outcomes as well as test scores from
middle and high school. The impact of a pilot school oer on time spent in elementary school is almost
three years, as can be seen at the top of column 5 in Table 4. The relatively large elementary-level
pilot rst stage is driven by the fact that elementary school applicants apply to enter in kindergarten,
while they are not tested until third or fourth grade. The reduced form eect of a pilot school oer
on elementary school applicants is a little under 0:2, but this translates into a much smaller per-year
eect of 0:06   0:07, reported in column 7 for models without demographic controls.
The estimated eect of a pilot oer on time spent in high school is similar to the corresponding
rst stage for charter applicants, while the pilot middle school rst stage is somewhat larger. On the
other hand, the estimated eects on ELA and math scores{both reduced form and 2SLS{are much
smaller (one is negative) and not signicantly dierent from zero. Here too, it's worth pointing out
that the standard errors are of a size that modest eects, say on the order of 0:1, would be detectable
in middle school, though the high school design has less power. The only signicant post-elementary
pilot school estimate is for one of the writing scores (This is 0:18, a marginally signicant result).
Finally, as with the charter lottery results, the estimates using pilot school lotteries are similar with
and without demographic controls. The pilot school estimates with demographic controls appear in
column 8.
Robustness and Magnitudes
The strong charter school eects on middle school scores reported in Table 4 are readily apparent in a
visual representation of IV estimates based on a version of equations (1) and (2). Averaging equation
(1) conditional on treatment status and risk set (and dropping covariates), we have
E[yigtjdij = 1;Zi] = t + g + j + E[Sigtjdij;Zi] (3)
15Dierencing (3) by oer status within risk sets, this becomes
E[yigtjdij = 1;Zi = 1]   E[yigtjdij;Zi = 0] = (E[Sigtjdij;Zi = 1]   E[Sigtjdij;Zi = 0]): (4)
In other words, the slope of the line linking oer-status dierences in test scores within risk sets to
the corresponding oer-status dierences in average years at a charter or pilot school should be the
causal eect of interest, .
The empirical counterpart of equation (4) for charter applicants' middle school math scores appears
in Panel A of Figure 1. The unit of observation here is a charter risk set. The regression line ts the
scatterplot well, with no highly inuential or outlying risk sets. The slope of the line in the gure is
0:44 when weighted by the size of risk sets. The corresponding 2SLS estimate of  using a full set of
oer  risk set dummies as instruments in a model without out covariates is identical.17 In contrast,
the analogous plot for pilot schools, plotted in Panel B, shows a atter line, with a slope of  0:045.
The pilot x-axis has a wider range than that for charters because some of the pilot risk sets are small,
and because applicants to pilot K-8 schools may spend a longer time in a pilot school than applicants
to grade 6-8 schools. But omitting the small risk sets and outlying rst stage values leaves the weak
negative relation captured in the gure essentially unchanged.
Most of the lottery results shown in Table 4 are insensitive to the inclusion of controls for applicants'
baseline test scores. This is documented in Table 5, which reports results with additional controls
and alternative samples. For reference, Table 5 also repeats the 2SLS estimates with demographic
controls from Table 4 (these regressions also include dummies for year of test, year of birth, and risk
sets). Baseline test scores are available for students who have taken the MCAS before applying to
the lottery; the sample used to construct pilot lottery estimates with baseline score controls therefore
omits elementary school students and K2 applicants to pilot K-8 middle schools.
The addition of baseline score controls has almost no eect on the charter lottery estimates, a
result documented in column 2 of Table 5. On the other hand, the pilot lottery estimates for middle
school math scores turn negative and at least marginally signicant with baseline score controls, as
can be seen in column 6. There is little relation between the pilot lottery instruments and baseline
scores, so this change in middle school math estimates cannot be attributed to omitted variables bias.
Rather, it stems from the loss of K-8 pilot schools in the lagged-score sample. We conrmed this
by estimating middle school pilot eects with demographic controls in a sample that includes grade
17The sample analog of equation (4) can be thought of as a strategy that combines Wald estimates based on Zi across
risk sets. Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation of the sample analog of equation (3) can be show to be the same as
2SLS using a full set of oer  risk set dummies as instruments (Angrist, 1991). Size-weighted least squares estimation
of (4) is not algebraically the same as this 2SLS estimator, but should be close (and is indistinguishable from 2SLS in
Panel A of the gure).
166-to-8 middle schools only. These results, reported in column 7 of Table 5, show estimates similar to
those with lagged score controls. The complementary sample that includes only K-8 schools generates
small positive eects (not reported in the table. Thus, there is considerable heterogeneity in the pilot
middle school math eects: grade 6-to-8 schools appear to be weaker than K-8 schools, at least as
measured by their impact on MCAS math scores. It should also be noted, however, that the omission
of K2 applicants to K-8 schools leads to a large drop in precision.
The results of adding an additional instrument to the charter lottery analysis are reported in column
3. The maintained instrument is a dummy for having been oered a charter seat any time after the
relevant lottery, including o the waiting list (\eventual oer"), while the additional instrument is
a dummy for having received an \initial oer" { that is, an oer of a seat in a charter school made
immediately after the lottery was held.18 The multi-instrument models are over-identied so we can
expect the resulting IV estimates to be more precise. In addition, the comparison of one- and two-
instrument estimates provides an over-identication test for the underlying exclusion restrictions. In
practice, the two-instrument results are close to those using a single instrument, while precision gains
are modest at best.
The nal alternative specication reported in Table 5 is motivated by the unusual history of Health
Careers Academy (HCA), a Horace Mann charter high school. As noted in the background section,
HCA was born as a pilot school in 1995 but converted to a Horace Mann charter school in 1997. Horace
Mann charter schools are like other charter schools in most respects, but their employees remain part
of the BTU bargaining unit. For the reasons detailed in our earlier discussion, we believe HCA should
be a seen as a charter school, albeit with union sta. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we explored
the implications of moving HCA from the charter to the pilot ledger.19
Reclassication of HCA as a pilot school has a modest eect on the charter lottery estimates: The
estimated impact on high school math increases from 0:23 to 0:3 while the ELA eect falls from
0:19 to 0:11, as shown in column 4 of Table 5. The latter estimate is no longer signicantly dierent
from zero, but this is due more to a drop in precision than to the changed estimate (reclassication
of HCA shifts 300 observations). The charter writing impacts also change little. Addition of HCA
to the sample of pilot high schools produces a marginally signicant ELA eect of about 0:11 and
an insignicant math eect of 0:09 (HCA becomes the third pilot high school in this case). The
eects of pilot high school attendance on writing increase and are more precisely estimated with HCA
included. The increase in ELA and math estimates when HCA is treated as a pilot school suggests
18The initial oer instrument can be constructed only for some schools; see appendix Table A1 for details.
19Like other charter schools, HCA uses a stand-alone lottery while pilot schools are part of the Boston assignment
mechanism. When HCA is introduced into the sample of pilot high schools, we dene risk sets according to whether
applicants picked one of the other two pilot high schools as a rst choice, picked HCA as a rst choice, or applied to
HCA with one or the other of the other two schools as a rst choice in the BPS mechanism.
17that HCA may be stronger than the two pilot high schools that are otherwise in our lottery sample.
On the other hand, the changes observed in this context are modest enough to be chance uctuations.
A natural benchmark for the size of estimates reported here is the black-white test score gap.
Among students attending regular BPS middle schools, blacks score about 0:7 below whites on ELA
and 0:8 below whites in math. The charter middle school eects of 0:15 on middle school ELA
scores is therefore enough to essentially close two-thirds of the black-white reading gap for students
who remain enrolled in a charter middle school in grades 6-8. The even larger math gains of about
0:4 are more than enough to eliminate the racial gap in mathematics achievement while students
are in middle school. The eects of roughly 0:2 estimated for high school ELA and math are also
large enough to close the black-white high school gap of about 0:8 in both subjects (assuming four
years of charter high school enrollment). Of course, these are extrapolations based on our per-year
average eects and not direct estimates. In practice, we should expect some reduction in the returns
to charter attendance over a long enough period. Moreover, these calculations assume that the eects
reported in Table 4 apply equally to blacks and whites. On the other hand, separate estimation by
race (not reported here in detail) suggests that this is indeed the case.
Selective Attrition
Tables 4 and 5 were constructed from samples of students who participate in charter school and pilot
school lotteries and for whom we have post-lottery test scores. Lottery winners and losers should be
similar at the time the lotteries are held, since a coin ip is all that distinguishes them. Subsequent
attrition may lead to dierences in the follow-up sample, however, unless the attrition process itself is
also random. In other words, we worry about dierential and selective attrition by win/loss status. For
example, losers may be less likely to be found than winners, since students who lose the opportunity to
attend a charter or pilot school may be more likely to leave the public schools altogether. Dierential
attrition generates selection bias (although those who leave Boston for another Massachusetts public
school district should turn up in our sample). A simple test for selection bias looks at the impact of
lottery oers on the probability lottery participants contribute MCAS scores to our analysis sample.
If dierences in follow-up rates are small, selection bias from dierential attrition is also likely to be
modest.20
Table 6 reports the mean follow-up rate for lottery participants in columns 1 and 4, and win-loss
dierentials in columns 2-3 and 5-6. Roughly 80 percent of charter lottery losers and about 70 percent
of pilot lottery losers contribute a post-randomization test score. These high follow-up rates are due to
20More formally, if attrition can be described by a latent-index model of the sort commonly used to model discrete
choice in econometrics, then selection bias in lottery comparisons arises only if winning the lottery aects the probability
of MCAS participation. See, e.g., Angrist (1997).
18the fact that our extract is limited to those enrolled in BPS at baseline and to our use of a statewide
MCAS data set. Follow-up dierentials by win/loss status were estimated using regression models
that parallel the reduced forms reported in Table 4. Positive coecients indicate that lottery winners
are more likely to contribute an MCAS score.
The estimated follow-up dierentials for charter high school applicants are small and not signi-
cantly dierent from zero. For example, high school charter lottery winners are about 3 percentage
points more likely to contribute an ELA score than losers (when the dierential is estimated with de-
mographic controls; see column 2). The follow-up dierentials for charter middle school outcomes are
a little larger, on the order of 4-5 percentage points. Although these small dierences are marginally
signicant, they seem unlikely to impart substantial selection bias.
There are virtually no attrition dierentials for pilot middle schools. The largest dierentials turn
up for participants in pilot high school lotteries, as can be seen in columns 5 and 6 of Table 6. For
example, controlling for demographic characteristics, high school winners are roughly 5 percentage
points more likely to have taken the ELA test than losers, a signicant eect with an estimated
standard error of 2.6. But this too seems unlikely to explain our results, which show no eect on
pilot lottery winners in high school. First, the most likely scenario for selective attrition has relatively
high achieving losers dropping out. Second, the attrition dierentials in this case are still fairly small.
Nevertheless, as a check on the main ndings, we discarded a few of the most imbalanced cohorts to
construct a sample of charter middle school and pilot high school applicants with close-to-balanced
attrition. We then re-estimated treatment eects using this balanced sample. Attrition dierentials for
balanced cohorts are reported in Appendix Table A3, while the corresponding lottery-based estimates
of treatment eects are reported in A4. These results are similar to those reported in Table 4.
VI The Anatomy of Charter and Pilot Treatment Eects
Charter and Pilot Compliers
Our lottery-based research design uses random assignment to construct causal eects for the subpop-
ulation that spends time in a charter or pilot school as a consequence of winning a lottery. What
sort of schools do these students go to? Do the losers in this group remain in schools that look like
the BPS average? Or, are the schools they come from unusual in some way? We're also interested in
whether winning lottery participants end up in schools with a dierent socioeconomic and ability mix
or go to schools with smaller classes. We address this set of questions using a causal IV framework to
describe the school characteristics experienced by lottery applicants in alternative states of the world.
We begin by dening the causal relationship of interest to be the link between characteristics of
19schools and classmates and charter or pilot attendance. Let the attendance variable be Di for applicant
i, where this is recorded in the year immediately after application to schools in the relevant risk set.
Let Xi be a characteristic of these schools, such as the fraction nonwhite or class size. To capture the
fact that Di aects school choice and therefore changes the characteristics of the school that applicant
i attends, we write
Xi = X0i(1   Di) + X1iDi;
where X0i and X1i are the potential school characteristics that applicant i would be exposed to if
he or she attends a regular school or a charter or pilot school. The causal eect of charter or pilot
attendance on i is the dierence in potential characteristics by school type, X1i   X0i.
Charter and pilot lottery compliers are applicants who would attend a charter or pilot school in
the year after application if they win the lottery, but not otherwise. To describe this group formally,
we write
Di = D0i(1   Zi) + D1iZi;
where D0i and D1i are potential assignments that tell us the type of school applicant i would attend if
he or she wins or loses (as before, the instrument is Zi, a dummy indicating lottery winners). Following
Imbens and Angrist (1994), we impose monotonicity:
D1i  D0i:
In other words, winning the lottery can only make charter or pilot attendance more likely. Given this
restriction, D1i   D0i is equal to zero or one.
In the causal IV framework developed by Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), the set of charter
or lottery compliers consists of applicants with D1i   D0i = 1. This happens when D0i = 0 and
D1i = 1. Compliers are those who do not attend a charter or pilot school if they lose the lottery but
do attend if they win. The rest of the population has D1i   D0i = 0, because either D1i = D0i = 1
(indicating applicants who attend whether they win or not, the always-takers) or D1i = D0i = 0
(indicating applicants who do not attend whether they win or not, the never-takers). Always-takers'
and never-takers' are unaected by the lottery, so IV estimates using lottery instruments do not reect
the impact of charter or pilot attendance on these two groups. Replacing years-in-charter or pilot with
a dummy for charter or pilot attendance, and using Y1i and Y0i to denote potential test score outcomes,
IV identies the average causal eect on compliers,
E[Y1i   Y0ijD1i  D0i]:
20This is the local average treatment eect (LATE) captured by lottery instruments.21
Here we are interested in the school environment or school characteristics rather than test scores.
Moreover, we focus on the average type of schools attended by compliers in alternative states if the
world rather than the treatment eect on school type. In other words, the parameters of interest are
1c  E[X1ijD1i  D0i]
0c  E[X0ijD1i  D0i]:
We think of 0c as the fallback position for compliers unable to attend the type of school to which
they applied (because they lost the lottery); 1c describes the schools attended by compliers whose
lottery applications were successful. Abadie (2002) shows that these marginal means can be estimated
by using Zi as instrument for the following second-stage equations (ignoring covariates):
DiXi = 1c + 1cDi + 1i (5)
(1   Di)Xi = 0c + 0c(1   Di) + 0i; (6)
where 1c and 0c are terms that incorporate controls { in this case dummies for risk sets.22
Compliers who lose the lottery end up in schools with a demographic mix similar to the system-
wide BPS average. This can be seen in columns 1 and 5 of Table 7 for charter applicants and columns
3 and 7 for pilot applicants. For example, the average proportion black in BPS middle schools is 47
percent (a statistic from Table 2). Non-treated charter compliers attend middle schools that are also
47 percent Black while non-treated pilot compliers attend middle schools that are 46 percent Black.
Likewise, the average proportion Black in BPS high schools is 0:51, while non-treated compliers attend
high schools that are 55 percent Black.
In some respects, the complier fallback position is somewhat better than the BPS average. This
suggests that charter treatment eects cannot be explained by arguing that the regular BPS schools
they would otherwise attend have unusually low-achieving peers. At losers' middle schools, for ex-
ample, the mean baseline scores of peers are positive while the overall BPS average is negative. In
high school, peer means for losers are higher than the BPS average for math though about the same
for ELA scores. Socioeconomic status as measured by the proportion getting a free or reduced price
21LATE can be generalized to covered ordered treatments such as years in charter or pilot, and models with covariates;
see Angrist and Pischke (2009) for details.
22Abadie (2002) uses equations like (5) and (6) to estimate the marginal distribution of potential outcomes for com-
pliers, but his approach works for characteristics as well. Because we use a saturated model for controls (risk sets), 2SLS
estimates of 1c and 0c are the same as those that would be generated using Abadie's (2003) kappa-weighting scheme
to estimate compliers' marginal means.
21lunch is also higher at the fallback schools than in traditional BPS schools (e.g., compare 0:77 and
0:67 in columns 1 and 5 of Table 7 with BPS means of 0:89 and 0:85). Class sizes at these schools
are smaller than the traditional BPS average. Also noteworthy is the fact that the characteristics of
fallback schools are similar for pilot and charter lottery applicants.
Successful charter and pilot compliers attend middle schools that have fewer minorities than the
schools attended by losers. In high school, however, wining compliers have more Black and female
classmates (though fewer Hispanic classmates) than losers. Other dierences in school environment in-
clude fewer SPED and LEP students and higher baseline scores at the charter middle schools attended
by winners. For example, the peer mean middle school ELA score for winners is 0:35 versus 0:11 for
losers. For high school compliers, the peer mean math score is 0:05 versus  0:385 for losers. On the
other hand, pilot compliers experience similar dierentials: among both middle and high school com-
pliers, peer mean baseline scores are higher, there are fewer LEP and SPED students, and the average
proportion receiving a free or reduced price lunch is lower for winners than for losers. This weighs
against a pure peer eect interpretation of charter students gains, since a similar peer dierential does
not produce gains for pilot compliers. Its worth noting, however, that charter middle school compliers
end up in smaller classes if they win the lottery. Pilot compliers, by contrast, attend schools with
larger classes.
Ability Interactions and Peer Eects
The distribution of school characteristics described in Table 7, as well as the fact that charter applicants
are positively selected, motivates our analysis of treatment eect heterogeneity. Specically, we explore
treatment eect interactions with an applicants' own ability and interactions with the ability of peers.
The interaction with own ability addresses the question of whether charter and pilot schools cater to
a relatively high-ability group since charter applicants (and pilot high school applicants) have higher
baseline scores. The interaction with peer ability provides some evidence on the extent to which peer
eects might explain our ndings.
The equation used to estimate models with interaction terms looks like this:
yigt = t + g +
X
j
jdij + 0Xi + 0Sigt + 1Ai(Sigt   sg) + igt; (7)
where Ai is student i's baseline score and sg is the average score in the sample, so that the main eect,
0, is evaluated at the mean.23 The set of covariates, Xi, includes baseline scores. The interaction
23The variables Ai and sg are xed in any given sample, including those that pool grades, but vary for a given applicant
from middle to high school.
22term of interest is 1. The corresponding rst stage equations are




1Xi + 10Zi + 11AiZi + 1igt (8)




2Xi + 20Zi + 21AiZi + 2igt; (9)
so that equation (7) is identied by adding an interaction between Ai and Zi to the instrument list.
The eects of charter middle school attendance are larger for students with lower baseline scores,
though the estimated interaction terms are small. This can be seen in the second column of Table 8,
which reports 2SLS estimate of 1 in equation (7). For example, a lottery applicant with a baseline
score 0:2 below the mean is estimated to have an ELA score gain that is 0:02 higher (0:094  0:2 =
0:019) and a math score gain that is 0:027 higher (0:137  0:2) than an applicant with a baseline
score at the mean. None of the estimated own-ability interaction terms for applicants to charter high
school are signicantly dierent from zero. These results weigh against the view that charter schools
focus on high achieving applicants.
The one (marginally) signicant own-ability interaction for pilot schools is that for high school
math scores. This interaction term is of the same order of magnitude as the charter interaction terms
for middle school. On the other hand, no signicant own-ability interactions emerge from the analysis
of treatment eects in pilot middle schools. Thus, the evidence in column 4 suggests that to the
extent that eects in either charter or pilot schools vary with students' baseline scores, those with
lower scores benet more, especially in the charter case. Overall, however, the variation in treatment
eects with pre-treatment scores is modest.
Table 8 also shows little evidence of peer eects of the usual sort. In particular, columns (6) and
(8) report 2SLS estimates of 1 in equation (7) when Ai is mean baseline score in the risk set. We
might think, for example, that one of the benets of charter attendance is the opportunity to attend
schools with higher-achieving peers. In practice, however, the score gain from charter middle school
attendance varies inversely with peer achievement. For example students, who apply to schools in
a risk set with peer means 0:1 above the sample mean are estimated to have an ELA gain that is
reduced by 0:07 and a math gain that is reduced by 0:1 for each year in charter. These negative
interactions are noteworthy since the charter eect on middle school math scores is the most dramatic
result reported here. A marginally signicant positive peer interaction appears for charter eects on
high school math scores, but this is the only evidence we have for interactions with peer means in
charter high schools. The corresponding interaction term for ELA, for example, is only 0:05 with a
much larger standard error. There is one signicant peer interaction for pilot applicants in the eect of
23middle school on math scores. It should be noted, however, that many of the peer-mean interactions
are imprecisely estimated, especially for pilot high schools.
VII Observational Estimates
Our lottery analysis use a sample of applicants and schools for which lotteries are both relevant and
documented. To gauge the generality of the lottery ndings, we also estimated the eects of charter and
pilot school attendance in a larger sample that includes all Boston schools. In this case, identication
of causal eects is based on statistical controls for family background and earlier achievement. We
refer to this analysis as an \observational study", to distinguish it from the quasi-experimental lottery-
based identication strategy. The observational results consist of OLS estimates of equations like (1),
controlling for student demographics and baseline scores.
The data structure for the observational analysis is similar to that used for the quasi-experimental
study. Baseline scores and demographics for middle school come from 4th grade data, while base-
line scores and demographics for high school come from 8th grade data. The regressors of interest
count years spent attending a charter or pilot school at the relevant level (e.g., years in a charter
middle school, in grades 6-8), as well as time spent in an exam or alternative school. Specically, the
observational estimates were constructed by tting
yigt = t + g + 0Xi + cCigt + pPigt + eEigt + altALTigt + igt; (10)
where Cigt, Pigt, Eigt, and ALTigt denote years in a charter, pilot, exam, or alternative school, with
corresponding eects, c, p, e, and alt. To parallel the exclusion of K-8 pilot school applicants in
the lottery analysis with baseline scores, the observational analysis that controls for baseline scores is
estimated on samples that omit students who attended elementary grades in a K-8 pilot.
The observational charter results, reported in Table 9, are positive and signicantly dierent from
zero for every score outcome except elementary school math. Moreover, at every grade level and
for every test, the charter estimates are more positive than the pilot estimates. Control for baseline
scores has surprisingly little eect on the charter estimates. In models with baseline score controls,
each year spent at a charter middle school is estimated to increase ELA scores by about 0:1 and to
increase math scores by about 0:18. In contrast, the corresponding estimates for pilot middle schools
are signicant and negative, on the order of  0:08 for ELA and  0:1 for math. For both pilot
schools and charter schools, the high school eects in Table 9 are positive and signicant for all score
outcomes, though the estimated charter eects are consistently larger than the parallel estimates for
pilots. The charter eects in elementary school are also larger than those for elementary school pilots;
24neither of the pilot estimates in this case is signicant.
The observational results in Table 9 are broadly consistent with the lottery results, but the mag-
nitudes dier. For example, the charter middle school eects in Table 9, while still positive and
economically and statistically signicant, are smaller than those reported in Table 4. Is this dierence
due to selection bias or to the broader coverage of the observational sample? Table 10 addresses this
question by showing observational results in and out of the lottery sample, alongside the correspond-
ing lottery estimates. These estimates were constructed by replacing the terms cCigt and pPigt in
equation (10) with terms that allow for separate eects for time spent in schools in and out of the
set of schools in the lottery sample. For example, we replace cCigt with lcCligt + ncCnigt where
Cligt counts years spent in a charter school that is included in the lottery sample and Cnigt counts
non-lottery charter years (note that Cigt = Cligt + Cnigt). The observational estimates reported in
Table 10 control for baseline scores.
Allowing the eects of time spent in schools in an out of the lottery sample to dier goes a long
way towards reconciling the observational and lottery estimates, especially for charter schools. For
example, the observational estimates of the eects of time attending a charter middle school in the
lottery sample are 0:16 for ELA and 0:31 for math. These estimates are not too far from the
corresponding lottery estimates with baseline scores (0:14 for ELA and 0:39 for math). The high
school estimates are also a good match: compare, for example, observational estimates of ELA eects
of about 0:19 using both designs.
Because the lottery and observational estimates of charter eects line up reasonably well when
estimated for schools in the same sample, the results in Table 10 support the notion that the observa-
tional study design does a good job of controlling for selection bias in this case. On the other hand,
the table also suggests that the charter schools in our lottery sample are among the best in the city.
Observational estimates of the eects of time spent in the charter schools not included in our lottery
sample, while still economically and statistically signicant for every outcome, are uniformly smaller
than the corresponding estimates for the eects of time spent in lottery-sample schools.
The observational and lottery-based analyses of pilot middle schools are also broadly consistent
in that both produce negative eects in the sample that includes lagged scores. The observational
results for ELA are more negative than the corresponding lottery estimates, while the opposite is true
for math. The match across designs is not as good for the high school results, where the observational
analysis using the lottery sample produces substantial and signicant positive eects for all outcomes.
In contrast, the lottery results for high school ELA and math are small and not signicantly dierent
from zero (though the match for writing is good). The variance across designs may be due to the fact
that the lottery estimates for pilot high schools are not very precise. Also noteworthy is the fact that
25small positive eects of pilot attendance on elementary school achievement turn up using both the
observational and lottery designs.
On balance, as with the charter results, Table 10 mostly reinforces the lottery ndings for pilots.
Moreover, with the exception of middle schools, the observational estimates of pilot-school treatment
eects are also larger for schools used in the lottery sample than for other pilot schools. Like the
middle school eects, the estimated impacts of time spent at a non-lottery elementary school pilot are
negative.
VIII Summary and Conclusions
Lottery-based estimates of the impact of charter attendance on student achievement in Boston show
impressive score gains in middle and high school. We also evaluate an alternative to the charter model,
Boston's pilot schools. Lottery-based estimates for pilot schools are small and mostly insignicant. In
an eort to gauge the generality of our lottery-based ndings, we complement the quasi-experimental
lottery analysis with an observational study of the full set of charter and pilot schools. This approach
produces estimates similar to the lottery-based estimates for the sample of charter schools that have
lotteries, lending credence to the observational analysis.
Across study designs and samples, the estimate eects of attending a pilot school are smaller
than the corresponding charter estimates. Although we cannot say pinpoint the source of dierential
impacts, a number of factors seem likely to be important. The student-teacher ratio is much smaller
in the charter schools, and the school day and school year are considerably longer. On both of these
dimensions, pilot schools are closer to traditional Boston public schools than they are to charter schools.
These dierences may originate in collective bargaining constraints that make it more expensive for
pilot schools to expand instructional hours and sta their schools with more teachers per student.
In addition, many of the charter schools in our sample use elements of the No Excuses model, an
instructional paradigm that is not common in public schools, pilot or otherwise.
A natural benchmark for our estimates is the black-white test score gap. Among students attending
regular BPS middle schools, blacks score about 0:7 standard deviations below whites in language arts
and 0:8 standard deviations below whites in math. Our estimated charter school eects are large
enough to reduce the black-white reading gap in middle school by two-thirds. The even larger math
gains (about 0:4 standard deviations) are more than enough to eliminate the racial gap in math while
students are in middle school. The eects of roughly 0:2 standard deviations estimated for high school
ELA and math are also large enough to close the black-white high school gap of about 0:8 standard
deviations in both subjects (assuming four years of charter high school enrollment).
26It bears repeating that the lottery results reported here do not estimate overall charter and pilot
school eects, even for Boston. Rather, the lottery results are generated by schools that parents nd
most appealing and, in the case of charter schools, those that have well-documented lotteries and that
continue to operate. Perhaps not surprisingly, our observational analysis suggests that the schools in
our charter lottery sample are among the most eective charter schools. On the other hand, results for
this relatively eective set of schools seem likely to be of considerable policy interest. Massachusetts,
along with a number of other states, caps the number of charter schools, while the U.S. Department
of Education is pressing states to lift these caps. It seems likely that over-subscribed and well-run
schools will be the rst to expand if caps are lifted. State regulators might also reasonably choose to
encourage replication of schools that have documented eectiveness and high demand.
27Charter Pilot Exam Alternative Charter Pilot
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8)
Teachers licensed to teach assignment 86.0% 60.0% 73.2% ‐ 70.6% ‐ 71.9%
Core classes taught by highly qualified teachers 90.6% 61.3% 78.2% ‐ 56.6% ‐ 77.8%
Student/Teacher ratio 15.7 11.4 15.9 ‐ 6.9 ‐ 15.8
Proportion of teachers 32 and younger 26.6% 64.5% 51.8% ‐ 27.3% ‐ 50.4%
Proportion of teachers 49 and older 39.9% 8.0% 11.9% ‐ 31.6% ‐ 11.1%
Number of schools 72 3 7 ‐ 2 ‐ 5
Teachers licensed to teach assignment 77.8% 53.9% 65.8% 90.8% 48.6% 54.4% 65.5%
Core classes taught by highly qualified teachers 84.8% 70.4% 70.2% 94.5% 45.4% 73.1% 69.8%
Student/Teacher ratio 16.1 11.9 19.5 21.1 5.2 11.9 19.6
Proportion of teachers 32 and younger 27.1% 74.5% 55.0% 30.0% 28.6% 81.1% 54.4%
Proportion of teachers 49 and older 36.0% 4.8% 13.6% 43.3% 27.8% 1.3% 13.9%
Number of schools 28 11 7 3 4 5 6
Teachers licensed to teach assignment 80.9% 57.6% 64.1% 90.7% 75.8% 57.7% 73.5%
Core academic teachers identified as highly qualified 85.7% 78.6% 72.7% 94.3% 80.6% 82.1% 83.6%
Student/Teacher ratio 17.6 10.9 16.0 21.1 8.9 10.6 17.5
Proportion of teachers 32 and younger 31.9% 66.9% 44.7% 30.0% 29.7% 64.3% 41.3%
Proportion of teachers 49 and older 40.3% 6.9% 15.0% 43.9% 25.3% 8.2% 7.7%
Number of schools 22 8734 42
III. High School (10th grade)
Notes: This table reports student‐weighted average characteristics of teachers and schools using data for 2004‐2007 posted on the Mass DOE website at
http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/state_report/teacherdata.aspx. The variable teachers licensed to teach assignment is the fraction of teachers who are licensed with provisional, Initial, or
professional licensure to teach in the area(s) in which they are teaching. The variable core classes taught by highly qualified teachers is the percent of core academic classes (defined as English,
reading or language arts, mathematics, science, foreign languages, civics and government, economics, arts, history, and geography) taught by highly qualified teachers (defined as teachers not







II. Middle School (6th, 7th, and 8th grades)                                         
                           
                                   
                                  
                                     
                                            
                                                        
                                                      
                                             
                                           
                                          
                               
                                                
                                               
                                                  
                                                           
                                                                     
                                                                  
                                                                   
                                                                 
                                                          
                                                        
                                                             
                                 
                                                
                                               
                                                  
                                                           
                                                                     
                                                               
                                                               
                                                              
                                                          
                                                        
                                                            
                                
                                                                                       
                                                       
                                                     
                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                
                               
                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                                
                
       
                                                         
                                         
                                            
                             
                             
                                 
               
         
      
             
               
         
      
             
               
         
      
             
               
         
      
             
               
         
      
                                        
                                                              
                                                                       
                                                          
                                                                       
                                                           
                                                                       
                                                             
                                                                       
                                                         
                                                                       
                                                                 
                                                                       
                                                              
                                                                       
                                                               
                                                                       
                                   
                               
                                     
                               
                           
               
                            
               
                                                                               
                                                                 
      
                      
     
        
     
     
     
                 
                       
          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                   
                   
     
                 
                      
                
           
                       
                                           
                                                                                                 
                             
                                                                                                              
                                             
                 
                                             
                               
     
                                             
                               
     
             
                                                                  
                                                               
             
                                                                      
                                                               
             
           
                                                                  
                                                               
             
                                                                    
                                                               
           
                                                                                 
                                                               
           
                                                             
                                                               
           
                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                   
   
     
     
           
   
           
                         
   
         
     
        
           
     
              
                
                
              
               
            
        
                  
               
                      
                
              
             
                 
        
                  
               
        
                                             
             
                                                      
                                               
                                     
                                                            
                                               
                                     
           
                                                          
                                                       
                                         
                                                           
                                                       
                                       
                                                                       
                                                       
                                       
                                                      
                                                       
                                       
                                                                 
                                            
        
           
                                 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                           
        
               
               
            
        
               
               
                                     
                 
                       
       
             
                        
       
           
             
                                         
                               
                                   
                                            
                               
                                   
           
                                            
                               
                                 
                                           
                               
                                 
                                       
                               
                                 
                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                          
            
                  
                   
                  
             
            
             
    
            
             
    
                                                                                           
                                                     
                                                               
                                                              
                                                                 
                                                                                          
                                                                   
                                                                                    
                                                                                        
                                                                               
                                                                                 
                                       
          
                                               
                                                                             
                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                          
                                                      
                                                                          
                           
                                                                                                                              
                                             
             
                                                                  
                                                               
 
                                                                          
                                                               
 
           
                                                            
                                                               
 
                                                              
                                                               
 
                                                                      
                                                               
 
                                                                         
                                                               
 
                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                          
                           
               
           
                                                  
         
         
           
         
         
               
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
   
   
   
                               
                             
                 
   
                   




    
                




             
   
                                       




    
                                       




           
   
                                     




    
                                    




             
                                     




                   
                                     




                                                                 
                                                                        
                                                                         
                                                                                       
                                                                                        
                                             
                                              
                                                       
                                                             
     
      
     
                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                             
     
      
     
                                                       
                                            
      
     
      
     
     
      
     
      
      
     
     
      
     
      
     
      
      
      
     
      
      
          
            
              
      
           
      
               
      
     
            
              
      
           
      
               
      
                                             
                 
                                           
                               
            
                                           
                               
            
             
                                                                        
                                                               
                         
                                                                            
                                                               
                         
           
                                                                      
                                                               
                       
                                                                   
                                                               
                     
                                                                                
                                                               
                     
                                                                
                                                               
                     
                                                                 
      
      
                                                    
                             
      
             
      
                
      
      
      
      
      
      
        
           
             
      
      
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                B.  Pilot Schools
A.  Charter Schools
Figure 1. This figure plots treatment-control differences in test score means against treatment-control differences in years in charter
(Panel A) or pilot (Panel B).  The unit of observation is a charter or pilot application risk set (N=34 for charters and N=51 for pilots).  The
charter slope (unweighted) is .66, and the corresponding 2SLS estimate is .44.  The pilot slope (unweighted) is -.006, while the
corresponding 2SLS estimate is -.007.  The pilot graph is produced after dropping one small imbalanced risk set.
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The data for this study come from four sources: the BPS assignment system, lottery records from
individual charter schools, and two state-wide datasets, the SIMS and MCAS les. The BPS assign-
ment data are documented in Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak, Roth and S onmez (2006). Lottery coverage is
documented below and in Table A1. Following the discussion of lottery data, we describe the state
data sets and our matching process in detail.
Lottery Sample Coverage
Charter School Lotteries
 Of the four charters that enroll elementary school students, three had no usable lottery data.
One K-8 school contributes to the middle school sample but is not used in the elementary school
analysis because it added elementary grades only in 2006.
 Of the 11 charters that enroll middle school students, ve contribute to the lottery analysis:
Academy of the Pacic Rim, Boston Collegiate, Boston Preparatory, Edward Brooke and Rox-
bury Preparatory. Two non-included schools closed before or while the study was under way.
Lottery data from four other schools were unavailable, either because they were not archived or
lost.
 Of the eight (non-alternative) charter schools that enroll high school students, four contribute to
the lottery analysis: City on a Hill, Codman Academy, MATCH, and Health Careers Academy
(a Horace Mann Charter). Two non-included schools closed before or while the study was under
way. Two schools do not admit via lottery in grade nine but rather admit students in grade ve;
they contribute to the middle school analysis.
Pilot School Lotteries
 Of the seven pilot schools that enroll elementary school students, ve were over-subscribed in
our sample window and contribute to the lottery sample: Lyndon, Mason Elementary, Mission
Hill, Orchard Gardens, and Young Achievers.
 Of seven pilot middle schools admitting 6th graders, six were over-subscribed and contribute
to our lottery sample: Harbor School, Josiah Quincy, Lilla G. Frederick, Lyndon, Mission Hill,
Orchard Gardens. We also have middle school scores from three K-8 pilot schools: Lyndon,
39Mission Hill, and Young Achievers. A fourth K-8 pilot began enrolling kindergartners too late
to contribute middle school outcomes.
 Of the six (non-alternative) 9-12 pilot high schools, two use lotteries and contribute to the lottery
sample: Another Course to College, and TechBoston Academy. One 6-12 pilot was not over-
subscribed. A single alternative high school that serves an older population was omitted from
the study.
The applicant cohorts contributed by each school are detailed in Appendix Table A1.
State Data
The rst state dataset is the Massachusetts Students Information Management System (SIMS). This
contains snapshots of all students in public school in Massachusetts in October and at the end of
the school year. The SIMS le includes demographic information on students, their current school,
residence, and days of attendance. We work with the SIMS les for the 2001-2002 through the 2007-
2008 school years. Schools are classied as pilot schools, charter schools, public schools, exam schools,
and alternative/special education schools using a grade-specic algorithm described below. The second
state-wide dataset is the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) database. The
MCAS les have raw test scores for Math, English Language Arts (ELA), and Writing for grades 3-8
and grade 10 from spring 2002-2007. We standardized MCAS scores by subject, grade, and year to
a combined BPS and Boston charter schools reference population. MCAS scores were merged to the
SIMS le using unique student identiers (the SASID). Students in the MCAS le but not in the SIMS
le are excluded because they cannot be assigned to schools.
Cohorts and Test Years Analyzed
The cohorts and test years analyzed in this study are summarized in the table below. Baseline years
are dened as the year a student attended 8th grade for the high school sample, the year a student
attended 4th grade for the middle school sample, and the year a student attended kindergarten for the
elementary school and K2-applicants-to-K-8-middle-school samples. There are no baseline test score
for this last group of students, but we pulled demographics from the baseline years listed in the table.
40Elementary Middle (non-K2 Middle (K2 High
school applicants) lottery applicants) school
Outcome 2005-2008 2003-2008 2004-2008 2004-2008
years Lottery application 2002-2004 2002-2007 1997-2001
Lottery application 2002-2004 2002-2007 1997-2001 2002-2006
years Baseline 2002-2005 2001-2006 1998-2002
Baseline 2002-2005 2001-2006 1998-2002 2002-2006
years
Notes: All years refer to Spring. Baseline grades are kindergarten for elementary school and K2 middle school applicants,
4th grade for all other middle school students and 8th grade for high school students. The 2003 middle school outcome
year is used only for 2002 pilot middle school 6th grade applicants, as we use BPS demographics for these students from
2001 and we do not have state demographics for 2001.
Analysis Samples
Three matched les constitute the extracts used for statistical analysis. The rst (the charter lottery
extract) was constructed by linking charter applicants to SIMS and MCAS data; the second (the pilot
lottery extract) was constructed by linking students with a rst-choice pilot in the BPS assignment
mechanism to SIMS and MCAS records; and the third and largest (the observational extract) uses
the SIMS and MCAS matched le without regard to charter and pilot application. Table A2 shows
how these three extracts were constructed. All three extracts are limited to students enrolled in BPS
or a Boston charter school as of the relevant baseline date.
Classication of Schools
We dene pilot schools as those listed on the pilot school network website at
http://www.ccebos.org/pilotschools/schools.html. We dene charter schools as those schools
identied as such by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Second Education website
(http://www.proles.doe.mass.edu). As discussed in the text, Health Careers Academy is a Horace
Mann charter high school. Boston Day and Evening Charter, also a Horace Mann charter, serves
over-age students. This school, along with Greater Egleston Community High School, a pilot school
that also serves older students, was designated as an alternative/special education school rather than
a charter or pilot and therefore omitted from our lottery analysis.
41Placing Students at Schools
In the Massachusetts State SIMS le, school designation is grade-specic. When a student repeats
grades, we kept the rst school in grade. Students attending multiple schools in a given school year
were assigned as follows:
 A student was assigned to a Boston charter or pilot school if any record for the grade shows
attendance at a Boston charter or pilot.
 If a student attends multiple Boston charters or pilots, or both a Boston charter and pilot, the
student was assigned to school for which the attendance duration is longest. Ties are broken
randomly.
 Students attending multiple traditional BPS schools were assigned to the school of the longest




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Charter Schools
Boston Renaissance Charter Public School x x K‐6 School lottery data are unavailable for elementary school.
Conservatory Lab Charter School x x K‐5 School lottery data are unavailable for elementary school.
Edward Brooke Charter School x x K‐8 Became K‐8 in 2006, so test scores are not used in elementary analyses.
Neighborhood House Charter School x x K‐8 School lottery data are unavailable for elementary school.
Pilot Schools
Gardner Elementary School x x K‐5 All applicants in 2002‐2004 are accepted.
Lee Academy x x K‐5 New school in 2004, all applicants in 2004 are accepted.
Lyndon K‐8 School 2002‐2004 x K‐8
Mason Elementary School 2003‐2004 x K‐5 All applicants in 2002 are accepted.
Mission Hill School 2002‐2004 x K‐8
Orchard Gardens K‐8 School 2003‐2004 x K‐8N o  Kindergarten class in 2002 (new school).
Young Achievers K‐8 School 2002‐2004 x K‐8
Charter Schools
Academy of the Pacific Rim Charter Public School 2005‐2007 2005‐2007 5‐12 Insufficient lottery records from 2002‐2004. 
Boston Collegiate Charter School 2002‐2006 2002‐2006 5‐12
Boston Preparatory Charter Public School 2005‐2007 2005, 2007 6‐10 All applicants in 2004 accepted.  Initial offer only 2005, ever offer only 2006.
Boston Renaissance Charter Public School x x K‐6 School lottery data are unavailable.
Edward Brooke Charter School 2006 x K‐8 Became K‐8 in 2006.
Excel Academy Charter School x x 5‐8 Insufficient lottery records.
Frederick Douglass Charter School x x 5‐12 Closed.
Neighborhood House Charter School x x K‐8 School lottery data are unavailable for elementary school.
Roxbury Preparatory Charter School 2002‐2007 x 6‐8 Ever offer only 2002‐2007.
Smith Leadership Academy Charter Public School x x 6‐8 Insufficient admissions lottery records.
Uphams Corner Charter School x x 5‐8 Insufficient admissions lottery records.  Closed.
Pilot Schools ‐ 6th Grade Applicants
Harbor School 2002, 2006‐2007 x 6‐8 All applicants in 2003‐2005 are accepted.
Josiah Quincy Upper School 2004‐2007 x 6‐12 No Grade 6 class in 2002 and 2003 (new school).
Lilla G. Frederick Pilot Middle School 2004‐2007 x 6‐8N o  Grade 6 class in 2002 and all Grade 6 applicants in 2003 are accepted.
Lyndon K‐8 School 2004‐2007 x K‐8 All Grade 6 applicants in 2002 and 2003 guaranteed admission.
Mission Hill School 2002‐2003, 2007 x K‐8 All Grade 6 applicants in 2004‐2006 guaranteed admission.
Orchard Gardens K‐8 School 2003‐2007 x K‐8N o  Grade 6 class in 2002 (new school).
Young Achievers K‐8 School x x K‐8 All Grade 6 applicants in 2002‐2007 guaranteed admission.
Pilot Schools ‐ K2 applicants
Lyndon K‐8 School 1997‐1998, 2000‐2001 x K‐8 All K2 applicants in 1999 were admitted.
Mission Hill School 1998‐2001 x K‐8
Orchard Gardens K‐8 School x x K‐8N o  Kindergarten class before 2003.
Young Achievers K‐8 School 1999‐2001 x K‐8 Error in records 1998, all K2 applicants in 1997 guaranteed admission.
Charter Schools
Academy of the Pacific Rim Charter Public School x x 5‐12 No admissions lottery for students in Grade 9.
Boston Collegiate Charter School x x 5‐12 No admissions lottery for students in Grade 9.
City On A Hill Charter Public School 2002, 2004‐2006 2002, 2004‐2006 9‐12 Initial only for 2002 and 2004, records unclear in 2003.
Codman Academy Charter Public School 2004 2004 9‐12 Initial offer data only for 2004.
Frederick Douglass Charter School x x 5‐12 Closed.
MATCH Charter Public High School 2002‐2006 2002‐2004 9‐12 Ever offer only 2005‐2006.
Roxbury Charter High Public School x x 9‐12 Closed.
Horace Mann Charter Schools
Boston Day and Even Academy Charter School x 9‐12, Alt Included in observational study as alternative school.
Health Careers Academy Charter School 2003‐2006 2003‐2006 9‐12
Pilot Schools
Greater Egleston Community High x x 9‐12, Alt Included in observational study as alternative school.
Another Course to College 2003‐2006 x 9‐12 No Grade 9 class in 2002 (new school).
Boston Arts Academy x x 9‐12 Selective admissions.
Boston Community Leadership Academy x x 9‐12 Selective admissions.
Fenway High School x x 9‐12 Selective admissions.
Josiah Quincy Upper School x x 6‐12 All students guaranteed admission.
New Mission High School x x 9‐12 Selective admissions.
TechBoston Academy 2003‐2006 x 9‐12 No Grade 9 class in 2002 (new school).
Notes: Schools are excluded from the lottery study (those marked with x in column (1))if they are undersubscribed,only have seats for studentswith guaranteed admissions, did not keepsufficient records,or if they do not have an entrylottery at the school level





III. High School (10th grade)                      
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